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Abstract. The evideuce on iuternational capital immobility is extensive, ranging from the
correlations between domestic savings and investment pointed out by Feldstein-Horioka
(1980), to re,al interest differentials across coimtries, to the lack of itrternational portfolio
divcrsification. To what degree does capital immobility modify past results forecasting that
small open economies should not tax savings or investnrerrt'? The answer cíepends on the
cause of this immobility. We argue that asymmetric information between countries provides
the most plausible explanation for the above observations. When we examine optimal tax
policy in an open economy allowing for asymmetric information, rather than simply finding
that savings and investment should not be taxed, we now forecast government subsidies
to foreign acquisitions of domestic firms. Some omitted factors that would argue against
subsidizing foreign acquisitions are explored briefly.
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Why is Capital so Immobile Liternationally?:
Possible Explanations and Lnplications for Capital Luome Taxation
Roger H. Gordon aucí A. Lans BovPnbcrg
Fcldstein-Horioka ( 1'J80), in a highly inHuential paper, report empirical evidence sug-
gesting that capital is quite immobile internationally. Many other papers since then demon-
strate the robustness of this result.' In general, these papers find that additional savings
in a cottntry lead almost dollar for dollar to extra investment in the country. If an economy
were small and open, these funds should instead have been invested throughout the world,
)cading to only minor chanfies in donrestic investment. In addition, thcre is strong evidence
of real interest rate differentials across countrics,z again suggesting important barriers to
capital mobility.
In a rclated body of literature, Adler-Dumas ( 1983) and French-Poterba ( 1991), among
others, have provided convincing documentation that individual portfolios are heavily spe-
cialized in domestic securities, in spite of the forecast from the theory that there aze large
gains from international diversification. Tax effects only deepen this puzzle. Investors
should be able, with only moderate effort, to evade domestic taxes on the income they
earn from portfolio investments abroad, while they should find it relatively difficult to
evade taxes on income from domestic investments. Hence, tax considerations reenforce the
gains from international diversification.
In spite of this strong empirical evidence on the propensity of savers to invest at home,
most theoretical papers studying capital income taxation in an open economy3 have as-
stuned that capital is ftrlly mobile internationally. These studies conclude that we should
not expr.ct to observe any taxation of income from either investment or savings in a srnall
We would much like to thank participants at seminars at Tilburg University, Harvard University,
NBER, Pennsylvania State University, the University of Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin, and
rspeciall~~ Sylvrctor EijFfingcr, for commcnts and hclp.
r See, for example, Penati-Dooley ( 1984), Dooley, Ftankel, and Mathieson (1987), and Bayoumi (1990).
Z See, (or example, Mishkin ( 1984), Cumby-Obstfeld ( 1984), and Cumby-Mishkin ( 1986).
~ Among other references would be Gordon ( 1988) and Razin and Sadka (1991).2
opcn cr~onumy. The arguments go as follows. If capital is fully mobilc internationally, any
tax ou incomc~ frrnn iuvcstmeut in the domestic cconomy cannot lowcr the return eaznccí by
r~apital uwncrs. sincc thcy cnn simply movc their funcls abroad. For production to remaiu
competitive in the country, in spite of the capital income tax, the cost of other factors (e.g.
labor and land) must drop by enough to compPnsate. Since the tax is thus borne by these
imrnobile factors any~vay, it would dominate to tax these factors directly and thereby avoid
discouraging investment in the country. A government might still want to tax the income
from savings accruing to domestic residents. However, if individuals can easily evade these
taxes on their holdings of foreign securitics,; no tax on income from savings is feasible -
such a tax would simply iuducc individuals to shift all their savings abroad. Accordingly,
uo snrL tax shonld hc, ubsr~rvr`d.
Itl spite of these forec:~sts, corporate incolue taxes aud personal income taxes on port-
folio IIICOIIIC elo c.xist, ancl ta rates arc often quitc high. Is the cxplal)ation simply that
capital is immobile internationally, thereby weakening the pressures described by the the-
ory to cut rates?
Thc answcr undoubtedly depends on the underlying reasons why capital is so immo-
bile. In section 1, we discuss a variety of possible explanations for the immobility ofcapital
that have appeared in the literature, and discuss their consistency with the empirical evi-
dence. Tlre explanation tllat we find most convincing, and one that has been inadequately
explored to clate, is asymmetric information between investors in different countries. In
partictrlar, foreign investors are at a handicap relative to domestic investors due to their
poorer knowledge of domestic markets. As a result, they are likely to be less successful
when sr~tting up new firrns, .urd they are vulnerable to being overchazged if they acquire
r~xistin~; domestic firms. In section 2, we lay out the partieular form of asymmetric infor-
mation we assume and describe the resulting equilibrium pattern of capital allocation and
ownership. Section 3 argues that the empirical observations can readily be rationalized if
4 Enforcement of income taxes occurs mainly through Corcing domestic firms and financial intermediaries
to report to the government the income earned by each domestic resident. But i[ individuals use foreign
financial intermediaries when investing abroad, then the domestic government has no mesna to obtain
independent information about this income, and so cannot easily enforce the tax. In principle, individuals
can buy even domestic securities through s foreign intermediary, and so escape monitoring by the domestic
government.3
asymmetric information is important by comparing the forecasts of our model with the
observPd evidence on savings-investment correlations, real interest rate differentials, and
the observed specialization of portfolios.
Section 4 considers the optimal taxation of savings and investment in the presence of
asymmctric information. Pcrhaps thc most surprising result is that a capital-importing
conntry should subsidize foreign acquisitions by enough so that the domestic rate of return
to capital is driven down to the rate prevailing on the world market. Intuitively, domestic
owners of firms are able to overcharge when they sell existing firms to foreigners. As a
result, if a country is small relative to the world capital market, it gains from mazginal
foreign acquisitions. Hence, it should subsidize these acquisitions until it is indifferent to
any further marginal acqiiisitions. While our model forecasts that domestic savings should
be taxed, the net rate of return on domestic savings should still equal the mazginal product
of domestic capital. Hence, by standazd criteria, savings decisions are not distorted. The
tax simply removes the excess incentive to save, due to the ability to overcharge foreigners
fot the firms they acquire. In capital-exporting countries, the model continues to forecast
no taxes on investment or savings, in spite of asymmetric information.
Rather than explaining the continuing presence of corporate income taxes, the model
instead deepens the puzzle by prescribing subsidies to foreign acquisitions in capital-
importing countries. Yet, it seems hazd to come up with examples of subsidies to for-
eign acquisitions, at least in developed economies. If anything, political pressures seem
to restrict foreign acquisitions. In section 5, we discuss some costs of foreign acquisitions
not considered in the model. In particular, foreign purchasers may acquire proprietary
technological information when they purchase a firm. Any future investment based on this
information will occur mainly abroad, where the new owner possesses better knowledge
about investment opportunities. If the acquisition had not taken place, future investment
based on this information would instead have occurred primarily in the domestic economy,
where the domestic owner is better informed. The implicit sale of this information to
foreigners therefore can reduce the country's competitive advantage in world markets, an
advantage tied in part to the proprietary knowledge it has. In future work, we hope to
model more carefiilly these costs of foreign acquisitions.4
1. Possible Explanations for Observed Capital Immobility
~Vhat factors might explain the immobility of capital, and how successful are they at
explaining the empirical evidence? A variety of possible explanations have been discussed
in the literature.
One possible response to the Feldstein-Horioka observations, seen for example in Finn
(1990) and Tesar (1988), is simply to argue that capital is in fact fully mobile, but that pro-
ductivity or other shocks in a country affect both desired savings and desired investment in
the country in the same way, leading to a positive correlation between the two series in the
data. Productivity shocks would not, however, esplain the observed lack of diversification
in individual portfolios, nor the real interest rate differentials across countries, suggesting
somc rliffcrcnt undcrlying cause.
A second hypothesis is that the countries being studied aze large relative to the world
capital mazket. As Murphy ( 1984) argues, if savings increase in a large country then a
nontrivial fraction of these savings will end up in the home country, leading to a positive
correlation between savings and investment. ~Vhen countries are large, they would also
no longer be price takers in the world capital mazket. Capital exporters would face an
incentive to restrict their capital exports, and capital importers their capital imports, in
each case so as to induce a favorable movement in the world interest rate. A number
of writers (e.g. Caprio-Howard ( 1984), Summers ( 1988), and Bayoumi ( 1990)), report
empirical evidence that countries do appear to change their overall budget deficit over
time ici order to decrease their net current account deficit or surplus, presumably in order
to avoid adverse changes in market interest rates. The observed correlation between savings
and investment dces in fact seem to be higher for large countries than for small countries,
as seen in Obstfeld (1986). However, the correlation remains high even among countries
that shoi~ld have very little market power in world capital markets, suggesting that the
main explanation for capital immobility is elsewhere. In addition, if market power were
important, we should expect to see countries manipulating their tax policy to reduce net
capital flows. Capital importing countries should tax investment and subsidize savings
tn rrrl~trr r'~pital imp~rt~, while capit~l exportinó rrnintrics ~hould snbsidizc investment5
and tax savings. Such a pattern of tax rates is not apparent in either cross-section or
time-serics data, further undermining this explanation.
Reasons have also been proposed why countrics may want to limit gross rather than
nct ontHows of capital. Savings invested abroad, for example, are more likely to escape
do~ncst.ic t.ucation. :1 numb~~r of OECD countrics, c.g. France and Italy imtil 1986, had
capital controls discouraging such evasion by preventing domestic residents from shifting
their savings abroad. Even when overall controls do not exist, regulations often require
financial institutions to invest only in domestic assets - this was true, for example, of
Japanese pension funds until 1987. These restrictions were always paztial, however. For-
eign direct investment by multinationals remained unrestricted. Hence, if there were profit
~~PPortunities available that individual investors or pension funds could not take advan-
tage of, firms could have done so instead. In any case, the correlation between savings
and investment has be.en high as well in countries such as the U.S. that have very limited
regulatory restrictions, and has not declined much over time as a number of countries have
eliminated such restrictions.
A fonrth hypothesis argues that investors f~ce high transactions costs when purchasing
foreign securities, discouraging investments abroad. French and Poterba (1991) explored
this hypothesis and concluded that the size of transactions costs needed to rationalize ob-
served portfolios would be far too large to be plausible. In addition, Tesaz and Werner
(1994 ) report that turnover rates on domestic holdings of foreign securities are if any-
thing higher than on holdings of domestic securities, undermining any argument for high
transactions costs on purchases of foreign securities.
Capital flows to certain countries may have been limited because of the fear that these
countrics may at some point expropriate the holdings of foreign owners. Whereas feaz of
expropriation may explain the lack of capital flows to some developing countries, most of
the data on capital immobility deals with OECD countries where expropriations have been
raze.
Exchange rate risk is often cited as an important factor discouraging international cap-
ital flows. Bhandari-Mayer (1990), for example, note that savings-investment correlations
1~~~.~, b~cr. m~~hr:~telc 1~~~.vcr ,~:ithin thc E~1S countrics, whcrc cxchangc ratc movcmcnts6
are not an issue. In principle, however, investors can hedge at least against short-term
exchange rate movements in the currency market, allowing them to take advantage of
diffcrenres in real rates of return on equity withont bcing exposed to cxchange rate risk.
In any rtse, the ewidence in Adler-Dumas (1983) atnd French-Poterba (1991) dces take
c~xchanKc rate movements into account, and argucs that in spite of these movements the
thcory forecasts far more international diversification in equity than we in fact observe.
The explanation for the observc.d capital immobility that We f1Itd most plausible, and
Whose implications We explore in this paper, is asymmetric information across countries.
Investors, by living and working in a particular country, know much more about the
economic prospects of that country than they cío about those in other countries.s If they
consider setting up a new firm abroad, they Would be at a distinct handicap relative to
local owners. Only gradually, for example, would they leazn how to deal with local banks,
the lucal distribution system, or the local supply network. They will inevitably have to
learn many idiosyncratic aspects of the domestic contract law, the local tax system, and
local customs regarding labor~management relations. In principle, foreigners can hire local
rxperts to help them through these hurdles. However, how are they to judge which experts
to trust? Local experts would have many opportunities to take advantage of the ignorance
of the foreign principal, e.g. colluding with local dealers in the sale of overpriced goods
and securities to the forcigner. The substantial asymmetric information between the agent
and the principal would make it difficult for t11e principal to give too much authority to
such an agent.
Foreigners will also be at an informational disadvantage when buying shares abroad
rather than in their own country. If they are buying securities in their own country, they
have easier access not only to firm-specific information but also to better forecasts about
future government policies affecting the firm. As a result, when buying securities abroad in
s Ben-Porath (1980) argues that when individuals eqjoy lonR-term relationships their repeated in-
terchange encourages the development o( cooperative behavior and trust between them. For example,
merchants may deal very differently with local customers than with other customers. This cooperation
implicidy provides some pooling oC inCormation. Domestic investo~a have considerable opportunities to
develop long-term rclationships with each other, perhaps only in part dealing with securitiea transactions.
Foreign investors, in contrast, would find it much more diRuult to establish such cooperative relationahips
with domestic investors, putting them at an informationsl disadvantage. We would like to thank Peter
Diamond Cor poinling out this article to us.7
existing firms, they can easily end up being o~-ercharged by more knowledgeable domestic
owners, and end up buying only the "lcmons."
In fact, Grubert, Goodspced, and Swenson (1cJ93) find that forcign subsidiaries in thc
U.S. report dramatically lower rates of retnrn than do domestic U-S. firrns, even after
controllinq for industry, age, and other such factors. While trattsfer pricing might explain
an unusually low rcported rate of return for subsidiaries owned by parent firms based in
countries with low tax rates, Grubert et al find virtually the same low reported rate of
return regardless of the parent's home country-
The Grubert et al data includes both greenfield investments in the U.S. as well as for-
eign acquisitions, and these acquisitions include takeovers of both closely held and publicly
traded firms. It would be plausible that foreign firtns would face much less of an infor-
mational disadvantage when taking over publicly traded firms. As argued by Grossman
(1976), the share price of these firms should under certain assumptions reveal the infor-
mation available to domestic investors. However, a growing body of literature argues that
obscrved share prices are at best only a very noisy mcasure of the true values of firms. This
is commonly oxplained by thc assutnption tltat an cutobserved nutnber of investors enter
and lcavc thc market for rcasons unrelated to news events affecting the true value of a
firm. Given this noise in market prices, foreign ittvestors will remain itnperfectly informed
aboctt the value even of publicly traded firms. In fact, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) find
that foreign acquirers of publicly traded firms pay a much higher premium for firms than
do domestic acquirers, even after controlling for industry, year, and the extent of com-
petition among acquirers, supporting our presumption that they are at an informational
disadvantage.
Another way that foreign investors might be able to avoid the efficiency losses arising
from asymmetric information about the value of individual firrns would be to invest in a
diversified portfolio of publicly-traded domestic firms.e One problem with doing this is
that the set of firms that list their shares on the public exchanges may not be representative
of all domestic firms - everything else equal, the "lemons" would be more likely to list
6 Including shares in a representative sample o( closely-held Hrms in such a portfolio would not lilcely
be feasible.8
thc~ir tilutres in thc Itopc~ Ilutt the :uarkct will ~~~~rrvaluc thcm. Iu most countrics, ouly a
tiu:nll fractiou c~f dotno~t.ic ~,qnity is teaeled au tl:c pulilic e,xc}tun~c~s, so tltat this sclection
I,ias can be important. In addition. there can still Lc asymmetric ittformation between
domestic and foreign investors regarding the value of a diversified portfolio of publicly-
traded shares, information not fully conveyPd through market prices due to the noise in
these prices. In the face of this asymmetric information, it may well be advantageous for
foreign investors to rely on the information their firms have available about the value of
specific target firms when investing abroad.
Thesc~ problems facecí by foreign investors due to asymmetric information when buying
a clíversified portfolio may seem minor when investing in a country such as the U.S. where
most firms arc publicly traded and wherc mutnal fitnds are rcaclily available. Even for
investmcnts in U.S. equity, however, a relativoly small fraction of purchases by foreigners
appear to consist of suclt divetsified investments in publicly traded firms. For example,
rluring the 1cJS0's virtually 80010 of the holdings by Japanese lllVCStors of equity in U.S.
based firms consisted of elirect investment;7 the equivalent figure for holdings by English
investors is 50Qio. Of the remaining holdings, an unl:nown fraction consists of investments
in equal-weighted portfolios.e Whether the above e,xplanations for this dominant role of
direct investment are correct or not, since most foreign investments in domestic equity
take the form of direct investment, the model we develop focuses on foreign purchases of
incíividual firms rather than of diversified portfolios.
Given foreigners' informational disadvantage when buying domestic equity, one might
expect that capital flows instead take the form of purchases of domestic government bonds.
Asymmetric information about future interest rates, inflation rates, and tax policy would
still put foreign investors at somewhat of a disadvantage but perhaps less so than with
domestic equity. However, portfolio models without asymmetric information, such as in
7 To bo classificd as clircct inccsttncnt, cacl: invcstur inusl IwIJ at Icasl IOcJu uf the sbares iu auy given
firm. For equivalent figures for a few other countries, see Gordon-Jun ( 1993). Figures on the composition
of U.S. holdings abroad are quite similar.
e In spite of its relatively small share oCworld GNP, the U.K. is the Iargest source of portfolio investment
in thc U.S., and the most important location for U.S. lwrtfolio investment abroad. This suggests the
importance of asymmetrie information between countries.y
Adlcr Dumas (19S3). forecast that foreigners should hold negative amounts of domestic
honds, to hed,Ge ~ie,ainst cxchange rate movemeuts when buying clomestic equity. The
rclativr pcnalty on equity due to asymmetric information would need to be severe to
revcrse this forecast of negative holdings of domestic bonds. ~~e thus focus on the equity
~u.u~kct.
2. Set-Up of the Model
Our model focuses on a small open economy that consists of one representative indi-
vidual who survives for two periods. In the first period, this individual stazts with real
assets of .4, which can cither be invested or used for first-period consumption.
Savings can be invested at home or abroad. If they are invested abroad, they earn
some real return r'; we assume the economy is small relative to world capital markets, so
take r' as given. If savings are invested at home, they earn a rate of return denoted by r,
which in equilibrium will be a function of r'. For purposes of discussion, assume for now
that r exceeds r'. If this condition is satisfied, all domestic savings would be invested at
home; our focus will therefore be on the extent and form of capital imports.
Thcrc are a fixcd number of domestic firms, which we denote by N, all initially owned
by thc representative domestic individual.9 Ex xnte all domestic firms are identical. If
firm i raises lí; from its shareholder and invests these funds in real capital, output in the
secoud lieriod will be J(lí,)(1 -1- f,),~o where j(lí;) is :r positive concave function, with
f(0) - 0, aud where f; is independent across firms and identically distributed. To avoid
issues of banknrptcy, we assume that 1 f e; ) 0. At the time investcnent decisions are
macíe, f, is not known; ex ante, its expectation is zero, and we assume for simplicity that
its probability distribution has no mass points. Also, N is lazge so that by the law of lazge
9 This assumption of a fixed number of firms is the device we use to limit the scale oC investment in
nc~ c~~~nnmv In an c~arlicr .cr~ion of lhc modcl, production rcquircd t~~.o factors, labor and capital, ~~~hcrc
labor supply was elastic but individuals were immobile across countries. In this two-factor model, the wage
rate could adjust to limit the amount invested. Since the analysis of the two-Cactor model was significantly
messier, yet the conclusions were basically the same as in the one-factor model presented here, we focus
on the simpler case.
~~ 'I'he capital itself fully depreciates during production.io
numbers there is effectivrly no aggregate uncertainty, given that è; is independent across
firms.
If the economy were closed, im-estment tivould occur nntil f'(Ií;) - 1~- r for each firm,
where f'(Ií;) - t7f(lí;)~[7Ií;. During the first period, the individual's consumption, C~,
woiilcl siuiply rr~ual his rrsidual atssets, .~ -~~ lí;. His consumption in the second period,
denoted by C2, would then equal
Cz - ~f(Ií~)(1 f ~;). (i)
t
How does this story change if foreigners can also invest in the country? This invest-
ment c:~n takc the form either of acquisitions of existing domestic firms or of greenfield
investments. The sequence of possible investments is as follows. First, foreign investors
can offer to buy ownership of some of the N domestic firms before any investment has
occurred in them, paying some amount E per firm. Since there has not yet been any
domestic investment in these firms, these purchases will be called greenfield investments.
Assume that the first J firms are purchased by foreigners in this manner.
Foreign owners are assumed to be at a handicap relative to domestic owners in setting
up and operating such a firm, due to their lack of knowledge about the domestic economy.
As a result, we assume that if they invest Ií~ in firm j, the resulting income in the second
p~~riod will equal f( lí~ )(1 - y), where y captures the costs they face due to asymmetric
information. If foreigners do choose to set up a new firm, investment in the firm would
continue until f'(1 - y) - 1-~ r'.
Once these greenfield investments have occurred, domestic investors can invest in the
N- J remaining domestic firms. After these iuvestment decísions have been made, the
valucs of the è; are revealed to domestic but not to foreign investors. At this point, foreign
invcstors can bid for shares in the firms set up by domestic investors, knowing only the
amount of capital, Ií;, invested in each firm.~l Domestic owners decide which shares to
sell, given the amount bid by the foreign investors. Denote by I the amount the foreign
~t Since K; is chosen before e; is known, its value reveals no information about c;.11
]I1V(`titOCS Sp(`nd acquiring shares in firms set np by domestic investors. The representative
d~mestic individual then consumes12
Cc -A-~Ií; fltJE-~l-S (~)
i11
in the first periocí. For later use, we denote net domestic savings by S. In the second
period, foreign investors receive the output produced by the firms they purchased through
both greenfield investments and acquisitions. Domestic residents receive the income from
the remaining firms.
In order to characterize the eqtrilibrium amount and pattern of foreign investment in
the economy, we start by analyzing the acquisitions process. We then work backwards to
rliscuss the choice of the Ií,. Givr.n the resulting valuc to domestic owners of setting up
a firm tlremselves, which tbey cither keep or scll to foreigners, we can then analyze the
decision by the domestic sharcholder whethcr to sell a firm to forcigners before it has bcen
set up. Finally, we discuss how r is determined in general equilibrium.
How many firms will foreigners succeed in acquiring? If foreign investors had full infor-
mation when bidding for shares, the value of the i'th firm's shares from their perspective
would equal f(lí;)(1 -F- é,)~(1 ~ r'), given that the rate of return available on the world
markct cquals r". But since they do not know the value of è;, all they can do is bid some
amount v; f(lí;)~(1 f r') for shares in the i'th firm, where their choice variable is v;.
What value for v; will they choose? To answer this question, consider the response of
the domestic owner to any given value of v;. If he keeps the shares, he receives an amount
in present value equal to f(Ii; )(1 -} É;)~(1 ~- r), given that the opportunity cost of funds
he faces is r. If instead he se)ls the shazes to foreign bidders, he receives v; f(Ií;)~(1 f r').
Hcucc~, Irc ~;ains by sclling if and ouly if
v~f(It;) ~ I(l~;)(1 f f~)
lfr' l~r ~ 3 O
In cquilibriuur, ~lr:u~es will be sold as loug as è; is less tharr or equal to some value e`, where
E' is defined implicitly by 1 f E' - v;(1 {- r)~(1 ~- r'). The fraction of firms acquired by
foreigners equals ~(e'), where ~(.) is the cumirlative distribution function for é.
~Z Recall that investment in greenfield firms is pnid Cor by the foreign owner.1z
Forc~ifin hidders therefore systematically ove~rpay fur the firms they acquire from the
perspective of the domestic owner. But since the foreign bidders face a lower opportunity
cost of funds than the domestíc shareholder does, foreign bidders may still gain from the
acquisitions. In particnlar, the expected value to the foreign bidders of the shares they
acquirc ~yuals f( lí;)(1 f e- )~(1 ~ r' ), where c- - E(È; ~É; C e' ). Since the country is
small relative to the world capital market, foreigners will bid for shares until they just
break even on the shares they acquire. They break even if
.Í(1i~)(1 t e-) - v;f(h~) (4)
1-~ r' 1 f r' '
or if u; - 1-}. c-. Note that v; G 1 since forcigucrs acquire the "Ictnons" among domestic
firms. Given the definition of e', we find that in cyuilibrium
ltF' l~r
1~- e-- 1-f r' (5)
Since e- is a function of only e', the left-hand side of equation (5) depends only on e'.
As a function of e', its value must lie in the range [1, oo). In particular, since E; ~-1, as
e' decreases, the left-ltand side must eventually approach one; in contrast as e' increases
without bound, so does the value of the left-hand side. In general, though, the value of
the Ieft hand side need not be a monotonic function of e'. For example, if the distribution
of e, Lad a mass point, then the value of the left-hand side would drop discretely at this
m:LSS point. For purposes of discussion, we will assume that the distribution function for
e; is such that the left-hand side of equation (5) is a monotonically increasing function of
E-',13 implying that as r increases the fraction of firms acquired by foreigners increases.t4
~Vherc results cíepend on this assumption of a monotonic relationship, we will make note
of it.
1n cquilibrium, the sizc of foreign acquisitions, I, equals
I- ~,(F.) (~~~~ÏiK;T(1~-E')~ - fi(E,) (~~~~fiK:)~1 fe-)l
(6)
13 A sufficient condition`for ehis to be true is that e; has a uni`form distribution. J
14 :1s asymmetric information becomes less important, so that the distribution oCc; becomes less disperse,
the fraction of firms acquired by (oreigners becomes more responsive to chsnges in r.13




whcro rt - E(f;~f, ~ F'). Given that ( 1 - ch(e'))(1 f et) f~(e')(1 f r-) - 1, equations
If) ancl (7) irnply that
Cz - ~f(f~i) - (1 -~ r`)f. (7a)
i~J
Sincc the crnuttry is stnall relative to the world cnpital ntazket, foreigners break even on
thcir investmcnts, so reccive only I(1 ~-r') in the sccond period on their initial investment
~if f.
lVc nost show that 1 f r 1 f' ~ 1 f r' if capital intports occur - the marginal product
of capital is not driven down to the cost of funds on the world mazket, and the return to
savings exceeds f' since investors can overcharge foreigners for the "lemons". To derive
the first inequality, note that the return to savings, 1 i-r, cquals -(óCz~81~;)~(8Ct~8lí;).
By using equation (6) to substitute for I in equations (2) and (7a), we can calculate this
ratio and, using equation ( 5) to eliminate r', find that
1 f r- Ï~~1 i- ~(E~)(f~ - r~-)~ ~ f~- (8)
To derice the second inequality, note first, using equatíons (5) and ( 6), that equation (8)
c:rn bc rcexpressed as~s
lfr-f~ 1-}. (r-r')f l
~~~J f(Ki)J
(8a)
It immediatclv follows that
f~ - (1 f r') - (r - r~) (1 -
~i~Jlf(K;)~ ~ O' (86)
where the inequality follows because of the concavity of the production function and the
fuct tLut I C I:.
15 The intuition behind this expression is as follows: Given the difference in the interest rstee prevailing
at home vs. abroad, there are potential gains from trade. Since the country is small, foreigners eun the
rate oC return, r', prevailing on the world mar~et, so that all the gains from trade go to the domestic
,hareholder. By investing more, the individual has more capital to sell to foreigners. Given asymmetric
inCormation, the fraction of his a.ssets that he does sell to foreigners is I~ ~.~ J f(K;).14
~V~~ now rlrrive the c~quilibrium amount of ~;rc~c~nfie(d investment. Tlrere are onlv N
possibh, domestic firms, all initially owned by thc representative domestic shareholder. If
this inclividual sets up a firm himself, selling some shares later to foreign acquirers, then
the prrsrnt ~.1lue of the income produced by this investment, net of the initial capital
expcnditures, cquals




wherc nc~ c,quality follows from eqiration (S). Tlris value simply equals the rents arising
frc~n the concavity of the production funetiuu. If a foreign investor purchases the firm and
scts it np himself as a grcenfield investment, thc present value of the resulting income to




(9a) (lfr') ~- f'(!í~)
wherc nc~ first equality follows from the fact that the foreign owner would set !í~ so that
f'(1 - ~) - 1 f r'. Again the value simply equals the rents arising from the concavity
of the production function. Since the country is small, foreigners would bid up the price,
E, untíl they are just indifferent to buying these firms. Sales take place if and only
if E is greater than the value to domestic owners of keeping the firms, as expressed in
equation (9). Given that f(lí;) is a concave function of Ií;, the value in equation (9a)
is larger than that in equation (9) if and only if Ií~ 1 lí;. The value of K; depends,
howevcr, on the amount of greenfield investment - additional greenfield investment leaves
thc representative domestic resident with fewer firms to invest in when trying to save to
finau~~e ,c,cond period consumption, leading to a rise in !í; in each of the remaining firms.
If the optimal value of !í~ would be smaller than Ií; even when all firms are owned by
the dornestic resident, then no foreign greenfield investment will ín fact occur. Otherwise,
there will be at least some greenfield investment. In equilibrium, Rreenfield investment
continucs irntil Ií; has risen by enough so that !í~ - tí;, implicitly determining the size of
J.
Finally, we chazacterize the equilibrium value of r. Without capital imports, the equi-
lihri~mi im-r~rm~nt cnnclitir,n f'(lí;) - 1 f-r implic~s a ncgati~~c rclation bctwcen r and !í„15
whereas the equilibrium savings relation UZ~U~ - 1~- r would be presumed to imply a pos-
itive rclation between r and total savings, S- VIí,. Together these conditions determine
r and Ií,. `Vhen foreign acquisitions are allowed for. cach of these relationships between r
and lí, changes. The investment condition is now equation (8), which for any given value
of r implics a lazger value of lí; than in the closed economy.~s Similarly, for any given r,
the sum of ciomestic savíngs and foreign acquisitions implies a lazger supply of capital than
in a closed economy. Together these relationships again determine the equilibrium values
of Ií; and r - due to foreign acquisitions, the equilibriurn K; must be larger than in a
closed economy.~~ If the resulting equilibrium valuc of lí; is less than lí~, then greenfield
investment will occur until the equi)ibrium vnlue of Ií; is driven up to tí~.
3. Consistency of These Forecasts with the Stylized Facts
Feldstcin and Horioka (1980) argue that the close observed link between savings and
invrstrncut iu u couutry is draznatically incorrsisteut with a model that asstunes costless
intcrnational capital mobility; the inequality of real interest rates across countries provides
further support for this conclusion. Similazly, French and Poterba (1991) maintain that
the observed specialization of individual portfolios violates standard models of optimal
portfolio choice, which assume that the joint distribution of returns on securities is common
knowledge.
To what degree cíoes the incorporation of asymrnetric information into the model help
resolve these inconsistencies between theory and evidence? To begin with, as aeen from
cqnation (5), the model implies that real interest rates must differ across countries in
eqnilil,rium if there are international capital flows. In particulaz, interest rates should be
higher in capital importing countries, a forecast broadly consistent with past experience.
In fact, the greater the degree of asymmetric information the higher r must be for any
16 Equation (5) can be used lo specify e' as a(unction o( r.
17 The equilibrium may not be unique, however. In particular, equstion (g) no longer necesaazily impliea
a uniformly negative relationship between K; and r once lhe eRects oC r on c' are talcen into aeeount. Sim-
ilarly, when the relationship between c' and r is not monotonic, domestic savings plus foreign aequisitions
together need not be a uniformly increasing function of r.16
~;iven sizc of c:cpital imports.cs
In acldition, the model forecasts an extreme form of portfolio specialization. If a country
is a cnpit.~l importcr, as is the case in the conntry wP focus on, any domestic shareholder will
not want tn invcst abroacl, where the avai)able return r' is less than the return available
in thc ~lomr.stic market. Similarly, a capital oxporting country will not import capital
-- if residents in this country are indifferent betwcen investing at home vs. abroad, in
spite of their superior know)edge about domestic investment opportunities, then foreign
icivestors ~vould not invest there. Therefore, residents in a capital-exporting country would
in cqnilil,rium own the entire domestic capital stuck :ucd invest auy further savings abroad,
whilc residents of capital-importing countrics wuulcl rather invest all their savings at home
:utd import any further capital from abroad. `Vhile observed portfolio cliversification is
much less than wotilci be forecast ignoring asymmetric iuformation, these forecasts suggest
far tnore specialization than in fact occurs. Note, however, that our model has no market
risk, so no incentive for portfolio diversification. If we added market risk, the model would
forecast only a limited amount of portfolio diversification. Expected rates of retum would
continue to differ between domestic and foreign securities due to asymmetric information
- investors would diversify to the extent that gains from diversification outweigh these
differcnces in rates of return.
WLat about the conclusion in Feldstein-Horioka (1980) that increases in domestic
savings Icad almost dollar for dollar to incre.cses in domestic investment? To examine
the icnplications of the model for this relationship, assume first that there is no greenfield
investment, so that domestic savings, S, is given by Ií - I. Note that we can implicitly
define .cggregate output as a function of the aggregate capital stock, lí -~~ Ií; - since
all firms are identical ex ante, K; - lí~N. We can then rewrite equation (6) as
lí - S - ~(E') (Nf(I'~N)(1 } E-)~ .
` 1 f r' (6n)
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To see this, consider a proportional expansion in the distribution oC c;, so that euh value o[ c; is
replaced by ac; for a~ 1. Holding e' fixed, as a grows the value of r satiafying equation (5) ineresses,
while the value of I satisfying equation (6) shrinks. Since f is an increasing function oC r, to achieve the
same sízc of I as before r must therefore increase further.17
Diffcrc~nti:,tiup tltis equation with respect to S, solviuK for ~Ií~r7S, and usinq equation (6),
we Hud th:rt
c)lí NfIIíJ 1Vf(lí,) ( J[ch(e')(1-}e-)J l ( r7r l
t7S - (Nf(lí~)-If')
lf 1}r,
~ ` ~ I `~S~J
(10)
In iutcrprcting this equation. assume first that r remains unchanged, i.e. that e' dces not
change ~s lí rises. Then, we find that alí~r7S 1 1! Not only does domestic savings lead to
additional domestic investment, even though the economy is small and open, but domestic
investnrcnt goes up by more than dollar for dollar as savings rises. The intuition behind
this surprising result is straightforward. As more cíomestic savings occurs, each firm is
larger. If r does not change, Lowev~r, then the s.une fraction of firms will be purchased by
forciqn invrstors as before, irnplying that capital imports expand as welL Since the rise in
S loacls to a ritit~ in 1. c~1í~~S ~ 1.
In general. of course, the value of r will change, and this change can easily rationalize
the less dramatic values of c~Ií~BS reported by Feldstein-Horioka (1980). In partieular,
the rise in lí will cause f' to decline due to the diminishing returns to capital, and by
eqriatioir (8) r would normally fall as well. The clrop in r would normally lead to a fall
in E', by equation (5), reducing the fraction of firms acquired by foreigners. This drop
in e' can well be large enough that on net capital imports decrease due to the rise in S,
resulting in a vAhtc of 81í~í~S G 1 as found in the empirical work.
If grc,c,nfield investment occurs, however, conclusions change dramatically. Given that
there is gr~nficld investment, we know that !í; - lí„ which defines the equilibrium value
nf r. As domestic savings go up, given r, foreign acquisitions go up proportionately, since
the fraction of firms acquired by foreigners remains tmchanged. But if K; and K~ are
both to remain constant, this process can occur only Uy having the extra domestic savings
and foreign acquisitions together crowd out foreign greenfield investments. Therefore, the
extra domestic savings lead to a growth in foreign acquisitions, a fall in foreign greenfield
investments, and no chanQe in the domestic capital stock. If there is greenfield investment.
therefore, the theory does not help rationalize the Feldstein-Horioka observations, but it
does have strong testable implications.
The above model is therefore consistent with the empirical results on the observed im-
mnhi?itJ- ~f c~Pir;,l ~nly if thFre is no óreenficlcl iucrstmcnt in equilibrium. How importantls
itt flct i5 grecnficlci iuvestrnent relative to forcign acquisitions? According to the data re-
ported in Auerbach-Has,~tt (1993), greenfielcl investments have becrn under lOqo of capital
imporrs to t.hc iJ.S. in recent ~rars. Some ccrtainly did uccur, howcver. But our model
ignores any of thc synergy gains from common operations emphasized as explanations for
foreign invcstment by Dunning (1955). If diffcrences in available rates of return among
rountrics are not sufficient in themselves to explain the observed greenfield investments,
ignoring the synergy gains, then our model would forecast that Ií should respond to ad-
ditional savings, as described by equation (10). In that case, the model is in principle
consistent with the Fcldstein-Horioka observations.
4. Optimal Dornestic Tax Policy
Past models of taxation of income from investment in small open economies, which
ignorcd asymmetric inforrnation, concluded that domestic investment should not be taxed
cven if the government lrau revenuc needs -- ~lirect taxes on imrnobile factors dominate.
In addition, taxes on savings by domestic residents would be infeasible if earnings abroad
cannot he monitored, an assumption we continue to adopt here. How do these conclusions
clrange once we introduce asymmetric information into the model?
Rather than introducing explicit tax instruments from the beginning, we start by as-
suming that the government has direct control over the number of firms J sold initially
to forcigncrs, thc amount of foreign acquisitions I, and the individual's net savings, S.
Given the differences between the resulting optimal allocation and the market equilibrium,
we then discuss what types of tax interventions would produce the optimal allocation.
To begin with, ~ve ignore any revenue needs of the government, and simply assume that
policy is set so as to maximize the individual's utility, U(Cr,CZ), where (from equation
(2)) Cr - A- S and (from equation (7a))
Cx-(N-J)f~SN }jE~-(lfr')I.
Given these expressions for Cr and Cz, what do the first-order conditions for optimal
n~li~}- i,nhl}.~19
Differentiating utility with respect to J. we find that firms should be sold if and only if
E 1 f - lí;f~(lí~)
- f'(Ií;) ~
A, uwu in equation ( 'J), this iti just what happens in thc uiarket equilibrium - firms should
bc~ solcl only if the pricr foreigners pay exceecls the rents earned from keeping them.
The amount of foreign acquisitions that occurs in the market equilibrium is not optimal,
however. Since the funds provided by the foreign investor earn an expected return of f'
but cost only 1{~ r', capital imports should continue until
f~-1fr', (11)
as c.ui he secn by differentiating utility with respect to I. In the mazket equilibrium, in
contr:vst, f' ) 1-F-r' (see equation (8b)). As in Akerlof (1'J70), too little trade occurs from
an efficicncy point of vicw in the market equilibrium as a result of asymmetric information.
Denote the .izc oí lí in this optimal allocation liy Ií'.
In combination, these results imply that no greenfield investment occurs under the
optimal allocation. Under the optimal policies, f'(lí;) - 1 t r', whereas the equilibrium
condition for lí~ is f'(lí~)(1-y) - 1 fr'. As a result lí~ G K;, so no greenfield investment
occurs. Capital in greenfield firms is invested iiiefficiently since y~ 0, whereas capital in
firms that end up being sold to foreigners is invested efficiently, at least ex ante. Since
foreign investors in either case simply earn the world rate of retum, 1 f r', the domestic
resident prefcrs attracting funds in the form of foreign acquisitions rather than greenfield
investments.
If we cíifferentiate utility with respect to S, we find a condition characterizing optimal
savings:
Uz - f~~ (12)
Since f' - 1 f r` under the optimal policies and C~i ~C~~ - 1 f r given decentralized savings
decisions, we conclude that the rate of return to savings, 1 f r, should equal the rate of
return available on the world market, 1~- r'. If investments can be financed with foreign
funds at a cost of 1 f r', there is no point in financing them instead with domestic savings
that ~~ost 1 L r if r; r'.20
Thcse first-order conditions are the same as wonlcl prevail in a small open economy that
~l;d nut face any problcros with asyrnmctric iuformation. Thc role of policy is therefore to
overcolne the misallocations that result from the presence of asymmetric information.
What types of tax policies can the government nse so that equations (11) and (12)
klold in the market equilibrium? One possible approach would be to impose an income
tax at rate r on all firms, but add a subsidy at rate o on firms acquired by foreigners.
With these policies, the representative shazeholder would receive second-period income
of f(lí;)(1 f È;)(1 - r) if he keeps firm i, whereas a foreign owner would instead receive
f(!í; )(1 ~ è; )(1 - r)(1 f a). We assume that the nct tax revenue will be returned to the
individual in a lump-sum form in the second-period.~s
ZVhat tax rates wOllld bC Ileeded t0 SUStaIII thc optimal allocation? To begin with, the
subsidy rate has to be large enough to increase !í to lí'. According to the tax-inclusive
version of equation ( 6), since r- r' this implies that e' must satisfy
lí" - S - ~(E`) (Nf (1~.,-v)(1 } f,)(1 - r)~ . (66)
1 ~ r'
Deriving equation (5) in the presence of taxes, we find that o must be set so that 1 t e' -
(1 } 0)(1 f e-) at this rcquired valuc of f'. ~Vhen t.uces are incorporated into equation
(8), we fiud that the after-tax rate of return to savings now satisfies
1 -~ r - f'(1 - r)(1 ~ ~h(e')(e' - e-)]. (8c)
For any given value of r, the increase in e' needed to bring Ií up to lí' results in a rise
in r-- since foreigners continue to eazn 1 f r` on their savings, the subsidy used to raise
F' simply accrucs to the domestic resident in the form of an increased rate of return to
savings. If tax rates are to be set so that r- r', then r must be set so that
(1 - T)Il -1- ~(E')(E' - P-)] - 1. (13)
How would these results change if the government has revenue needs? Individuals are
receivitlg pure profits in this model, due to the cotlcavity of the production funetioa. Hence
19 In fact, net tax revenue will be 2ero under the optimal policies, since each group of inveaton is paid
the average gross return generated on their investments.21
nc~ ~;ovcrumcut could colle~ct rcvomte withont distortiug any decisions by taxing these pure
profits. ~Vould it choose to deviate in any other ways frorn the above policies, which were
~'hosc,n i~noriug any trvennc ncecis'~
To jndge this, consider the government's choíce of the rate of retum to individual
savings, r, and the amonnt of capital imports. I. It can control these allocations indirectly
through taxes on savings and subsidies to capital imports, and for simplicity we treat the
allocations rather than the taxes as the instruments. Given the presence of pure profits
taxes. the government's objective is to maximize
U(C,,Cz) f aR
with respect to r and !, where a measures the valuc uf additional government revenue,
Ci -.4 - S, C2 - S(1 } r) since pure profits have been taxed away, and
R-Nf (I NS) -(1fr')I-(1f r)S.
In setting r, the government must take into account the constraint that r 1 r' - if r
were to drop below r`, all domestic savings would shift abroad. If the government were to
raisc r and sitnnltaneously adjust I so as to Icave Ií constant, then the resulting change
in social welfare equals
-(a-U2)S-a(r-r')~. (14)
As long as savings is an increasing function of the interest rate, this expression is negative
for all values of r~ r',20 implying that r will be set at its minimum feasible value of
r'.lt If we differentiate tíre government's objective function with respect to I, we find that
f' - 1fr'. As a result, the optimal allocation is identical to the one chosen without revenue
Zo When we assume that the government has revenue nceds, we are assuming that govemment revenue
is more valued that private consumption, so that a) Uz.
Zt If a taz on foreign-source earnings could 6e enCorced, then equation (14) implies that the optimal
value oC r will be below r'.22
uceds. .at;ain. t.l,e marginal product of capital, uud thc return to individual savings, are
both set oryual to the rate of return, r', prevailin~; on the world market.22
Thesr results prescribinfi a subsidy to foreign acqnisitions a.nd a tax on domestic savings
are in sharp rnntrast to the forecasted tax policy in a large open economy. As noted above,
a I:crfic~ c~apital importcr will want to discourage capital imports in order to reduce the rate
uf rc~tnru rrquired by forcifin iuvestors. Similarly, Corcíon and Varian (1989) show that
when the ciistribution of returns on a country's cquity has idiosyncratic components, the
country has markPt power over access to this distribution of returns. Hence, it will want to
discourage foreign purchases of domestic eryuity in order to drive up the price of its equity.
In contrast, when asymmetric information explains the lack of capital mobility, a capital
importer will want to explicitly encourage foreign acquisitions of domestic eqtuty.
So far we have examined optimal tax policy in a small capital-importing country. What
about policy in a capital-exporting country'? In such a country, investors are indifferent
at the margin betwcen investing at home or abmad. The government cannot reduce the
net-of tax return to domestic investment, since investors can always go elsewhere. The
analysis of this case in fact would be identical to the previous analysis in Gordon (1986) and
ltariu Sadka (1991). Iu p:uticular, it would coutiuue to show that source-based capital
incomc~ taxes ~re dominated by direct taxes on immobile factors, and that residence-based
capital income taxes are infeasible.
5. Discussion
This madel could be complicated in a variety of directions. For example, we assumed
that existing firms had no way to signal information about their actual value of E; to
potential foreign investors, yet would want to signal if they could. The firm's initial capital
stock, I~;, can not serve as a signal, since it is chosen before e; is known. One signal that
'~ lhex conclusons depend on the availability ol explicit taxes on the immobile Cactor bearing the
incidence of lhis tax. If the government could not impose a 100oIo profits tax, for exstnple, then the
optimal policies would change. Whereas the rate of return to savings would be kept equal to r', the
subsidies to foreign acquisitions would fall in order to save on revenue, resulting in s fall in K from the
value seen above. Similarly, in our original model with two Cactors, capital and labor, optimal tsx policy
would set f' - l~ r' and r- r' only so long as the government has available a tax on labor income.
Note that f' - 1 f r- 1} r' would remain optimal even though Iabor supply is elastic.23
c~an bc c~ffcctive. howcvcr. is an offer to retain ,onlc of thc shares in the firm in exchange
for a somewhat Ligher price for the rernaining shares. Only firms that are doing relatively
wc.ll wonld fincl this option more attractivc thau scdling all of the shares at a somewhat
lowcr pricc.
To what degrc,e does the equilibrium changc when such a signal is used? Such a
signalling equilibrium can lead to more firms having foreign owners. In spite of this,
however, capital imports need not be larger since fewer shares are sold by each firm. To
SCP th1S, consider the special case in which E; is distributed uniformly on the interval [-a, a],
and consider the particular signalling equilibriurn in which a firm can sell either all or the
fraction ~1 of its shares to the foreign investors. For simplicity we ignore the possibility
of grcenficld investments. The options open to foreign investors are now to offer to pay
sornc alnount vj( Ií; )~(1 ~- r') for firms that scll all thcir shares, and another amount
~cv'f( Ii;)~(1 ~- r') for the fraction p of the shares of firms that choose to sell only this
amonut. What characterizes the equilibrium vnlues of v and v'?
For any ~;ivcn valucs uf v and v', thcre will be sorne value of E;, denoted by E„ such
that a donrestic firm with this E; would be just indifferent to selling all its shares or the
fraction p of its shares. Being indifferent implies that
vÏ(1~') - pv~jÍhc) ~(1 -~a) f(lí~)(1 f Ei)
1~ r' 1-}- r' 1 f r
(15)
Any firm with E; C E~ would strictly prefer to sell all of its shares, and conversely.
Similarly, there will be some other value of E; ~ E~, denoted by EZ, such that a domestic
firm with this E; would be just indifferent to selling the fraction ~ or selling none of its
shares, implying that
v~f(I~~) - f(lí~)(1 f Ez) (15a)
lfr' l~r
Any finn with E, ~ EZ would strictly prefer not to sell any of its shares, and conversely.
Given this bchavior, foreigners break even on their purchases of firms selling all of their
shazes if v- 1} E(E;~E; C E~ )- 1.{- .5(E~ - a); they break even on their joint ventures if
v' - 1-f E(E; ~Ei G E; C EZ )- 1 f.5(Ei -F EZ). Substituting these equilibrium conditions into
equations (15) and ( 15a) gives two conditions which together determine the values of E~
nnrl F' If ~~ ~ l-.5(1 ~ r)~(1 ~- r'), then thc rnily fcasiblc snlution to thcsc cquations scts24
f~ --c~ and F.', - E', ~~-hcre E' is the solutiou foimd ill the prcvions Inodcl. As a result,
no firms a~re sold cntirely and the same fraction of firms as before have foreign owners.
I3nt siucr unly tóc fr~ction tc of thc shares o{ t.hcwc~ tirms xrc now hc~infi sold, total capital
imports am uow rc~duced Ly thc Cractiou 1- ~c.
If ~c ~ 1-.5(1 ~- r)~(1 f r' ) C.5, then t.lrere will lie a separating e~quilibrium with
Ei ~ -u and EZ ~ E'. Now more firnts than hcforc will Le selling nt least some of their
shares t~ foreigners. But do capital imports go up as a result? Previously, capital imports
satisfied c,qnation ( 6). Now thcy instead satisfy
I~-(L~f(I~~)l~~(EI)(1~.5(EI-n))f{l(~(E2)-~(EI))(1f.5(El}E2)~' (se) 1` 1 -F r' J
Since I` is continuous in p, it is clear that for ~c not muclr below 1-.5(1-~r)~(1~-r'), I' will
still be smaller than thc I satisfying equation ( fi). A more careful algebraic compazison
revcals that I' is smaller than I for all possiblc values of ti. Therefore, this partiarlaz
tiignalliufi equilibrium always lcads to smallcr c:ipital irnports, so would imply lower utility
for the domcstic resident than the equilibrium without signalling. If we allowed additional
lreterogeneity in the possible fractions sold, leading to greater separation among domestic
firms, it may be that an equilibria can be found that will involve increased capital imports.
Bnt the I~asic conclusion .vould mmain that capital imports arc limited in spite of the
intcrest rate cíiffcrentials.
One other more detailed issue that we feel could well be important is that foreigners may
be able t.o observe some forms of capital more easily than others, e.g. tangible assets such
as machines may be readily observable, but intangible assets such as goodwill, durability
of the capital stock, the quality of mazket information, etc. may not be. We could capture
this Iry a5suming that there are two possible forms of capital: intangible capital, If", and
tangiblc capital, IT`. Ex post output might then eclual f(K",K')(1 -F ë;), but foreigners
observe only I~c. Private incentives to invest in Ií" are reduced because of the possibilíty of
sales to foreigners, ~vho do not observe Ií" so do not compensate the firm for any additional
investment in I:". If I~' and IC" are complements in production, then foreign investors
worrld t rcat a higher observed lí' in part as a signal that lí" is higher as well, adding to the
firi~~'~ i::~-~~irti~r tn im.crt in I~'. Sincc fnrcigncrti rrcoonizc that this manipulation is going25
c~n. thc~- will acljust their bid for shares so as to ;GSUre that ex post they earn the going
ratc cif rc~tnrn, r'. Tlte resnlt of this manipulati~n is an efficiency loss from the country's
pcrvpccti~-c~. Pc,licy tihoctlcl as a result bc clcsi~ucd to sltift tltc ftrnt's composition of iuputs
to thc c..clnes that would be chosen with common knowledge, leading to a different form of
Govc~rnuccnt. iutcrvoutiuu.
Sncli cotnplications do not change thc liasic couclusions. Adding asyrrunetric infor-
mation to modcls of international capital allocation does contribute to explaining past
c~mpirical obscrvations on capital immobility. However, it fails to explain the important
role of corporate income taxes in developed rountries. Not only dces the model con-
tinue to forec:LSt no taxes on savings or investment in capital-exporting countries, but it
:clso forecasts no clistortions to savings incenti~-es'~ aud subsidies to foreign acquisitions
in capital-i~nporting countries. This latter conclusion is pazticularly puzzling, given the
snr;uiul;ly strong clomcstic political opposition to t.:ckcoccrs by foreign firms. What factors
migLt c~xplaiu thc lack of subsidics to foreign acquisit.ions?
One tiitnple story is that the presenee of snch a subsidy may induce domestic investors
to assume the guise of a foreign investor when buying shares, in order to qualify for
thc suhsicly. If the tax authorities cannot succcssfiilly monitor the true residence of the
owner cif cach share, Lhe optimal tax policy certainly changes. However, it would still
involve subsidies to domestic investment and taxes on domestic savings, so still seem
countcrfactual.
One consideration omitted from our model, ltowever, is the possibility that foreign
acquisitions can lead to an exchange of information between the new foreign owners and
the existing labor force in the firm. Information flows can go in both directions. In
the context of developing cotmtries or Eastern European countries during the transition,
economists often argue that foreign acquisitions in the country allow domestic residents to
see how firms from other countries conduct business, enabling them to learn from these
operations how better to run other local businesses. To the extent that this domestic
learning spills over to individuals other than those who sold the firm to the foreigners,
Z3 Whilc the return to savings would be taxed, the net rate of return would equal the marginal product
o( domestic capital, implying no distortions to ineentives.26
tLcrc is in principlr an additional firound for governmcnt intervention to subsidize foreign
~cquisítions, so as to internalize this spillover, reinforcing the prior results.
Iuforrnation rnn flow in the opposite direction a5 well, however. The domestic firm
~nay cnvn Imtents. Luve noupatented expertise in particular technologies, employ workers
tikillod ut dcvoloping new technologics, or simply know better how to organize the internal
uperatiuns of a firm. ~Vhen a foreigner acquires owncrship of the firm, it will be in a position
t.o acquire this intangible capital, as well as the physical :~ssets of the firm. In making use
of this iutangible capital, however, it will be constrainecí by its relatively limited knowledge
about thc lrost economy. As a result, future investments based on this intangible capital
would occur primarily in the foreign firm's home country. If the domestic firm had not
heen acquired. however, the domestic owncr would have rnade use of his intangible assets
primarily in the domestic economy, where he knows better how to operate. The acquisition
therefore not only affects the ownership of capital currently, but also has implications for
future irrvestment patterns.
Trying to deal explicitly with future investments, made based on firm-specific intangible
capital. would raise a variety of complications that are well beyond the scope of this paper.
What directions would such a model likely take'? If we were to extend the model to three
periods, to allow foreign acquisitions to affect investment patterns in the second period, we
rvonld f~~cc :r tiituatiorr r~.licre firms diffcred cx aute at tlrc ircgiuuing of the second period
in their technologies, a complication not faced in thc current model. To deal with this,
we conld allow for takeovors among domestic firrns before investment occurs in the second
period. As a result, those with more profitable technologies could expand by buying up
other domestic firms, so as to spread the use of their superior technology more broadly,
Ieading if there are no other complications to only the most profitable technology being
used in the domestic economy. Whether the domestic owner expands further by investing
abroad ~vould depend on whether the gain from using a superior technology outweighs the
loss from operatinR at an informational disadvantage ahmnd. If the intangible capital wem
cievelopPd in a capital importing country, then likely all use of the capital would occur in
the domestic economy if the firm remains owned by the domestic resident.
If the firm were acquired by a foreign owner during the first period, however, then the
n~.v rn~~.~rr R~nllld bc nblc !n wpr.nd ~tsc of this t~~l:nolog}- throughout his homc cconom}-~luring the second period, bidding more for firms there than others would who have access
to worse tecbnology. ~Vhether the foreign owner expands further in the host country would
~lepend on whethcr grcenficld investments pay off there, given that the foreigner is at an
informational disadvantage.2't
TLc resnlt i, that tlic urarket valuc of firtns iu the capital -importing country in the
secoud period would be affected by whether domestic intangible assets were acquired by
foreigners during the first period.ZS If a particular foreign investor can expand production
to a larger pool of firms in the second period thatl can other investors, then he would
find intangiblc .rssets relatively more valuable in the first period, introducing an additional
eonsicleration into the acquisition process in the first period. As a result, we would expect
to find that investors bascd in larger countries havc aIl advantage when bidding for firms
with intnngible assets in the first period.
A cou~Itry's government, in setting policy, wonld necmd to take into account that foreign
acquisit.iuus in thc first pcriod result in a drop in thc value of domestic firms in the second
period (ur a drop in wage rates, if labor were added as a factor). This drop in value would
not be taken into acconnt by the owner selling out to the foreign acquirer. As a result,
the go~rrnment would face an additional consideration, in itself creating an incentive to
cliscournge sales of firms to foreigners. In effect, a country's comparative advantage depends
un thc cluality of the technology available to firms owned by domestic residents.
~Vhile we believe that asymmetric informatiou between countries provides a promising
direction for explaining the empirical evidence on the international immobility of capital,
there seem to be many more fruitful dírections to pursue before we can feel confident we
:~nderstand the full implications of asymmetric information for tax policy.
24 That foreign acquisitions were profitable in the (irsl perioJ does not imply that greenfield investments
would be profitable in the second period.
25 IC we introduced labor as a second factor into the model, then we would conclude that the equilibrium
wage in the second period would be affected by foreign acquisitions in the first period.28
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